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Abstract—Energy storage and demand-side response will play
an increasingly important role in the future electricity system.
We extend previous results on a single energy storage unit to
the management of two energy storage units cooperating for
the purpose of price arbitrage. We consider a deterministic
dynamic programming model for the cooperative problem, which
accounts for market impact. We develop the Lagrangian theory
and present a new algorithm to identify pairs of strategies.
While we are not able to prove that the algorithm provides
optimal strategies, we give strong numerical evidence in favour
of it. Furthermore, the Lagrangian approach makes it possible
to identify decision and forecast horizons, the latter being a time
beyond which it is not necessary to look in order to determine
the present optimal action. In practice, this allows for real-time
reoptimization, with both horizons being of the order of days.
Index Terms—control, two storage units, arbitrage, price-
maker, market impact, energy, Lagrangian.
I. INTRODUCTION
Power systems around the world are facing many challenges
due to decarbonization. Under the revised Climate Change
Act 2008 [19], the UK set ambitious plans to reduce carbon
emissions 100% (net zero) by 2050 compared to 1990 levels.
This requires fundamental changes in many sectors, including
the power system, which are already taking place. We are
interested in the role grid-scale electric energy storage can
play in this transformation.
The deregulation of energy markets, driven in the UK
by the Electricity Act 1989 [18], created a more favourable
environment for energy storage to enter the power system
[20]. For example, the price-taker and price-maker cases were
studied in [31], which also analysed the arbitrage value in the
former case using PJM price data. They conclude there was a
significant increase in the arbitrage value of energy storage in
the late 2000s, which led to an increasing interest in energy
storage. Moreover, [14] describes four other reasons for this
increasing interest: advances in storage technologies, increase
in fossil fuel prices, challenges to sitting new transmission
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and distribution facilities, and opportunities for storage with
variable renewable generation.
A possible way to capture the value of energy storage to the
system is through price arbitrage. How should one optimally
manage a fleet of electric energy storage units with market
impact to maximize profit by buying electricity when it is
cheap and selling it when it is expensive? This was studied for
a single storage unit in [11]. The aim of this work is to study
the problem for two storage units. We recognize that not all
the value of storage can be captured by price arbitrage, since
it can provide other services such as operating reserves, firm
capacity, network reinforcement deferral, black-start support,
power quality and stability, and aid in the integration of
renewables [13], [14]. Nevertheless, arbitrage has already been
used to approximate the value of storage [11], [31].
There are essentially two ways in which energy storage units
can interact: cooperation or competition. In the former, the
objective is to maximize the joint profit made by the units,
while in the latter, the objective of each unit is to maximize
its own profit. See [7], [12], [23], [33] and [35] for examples
of both problems in the context of energy storage or demand-
side response. Our work focuses on the cooperative problem.
Market prices can be modelled as deterministic or stochas-
tic. For stochastic approaches, see [5], [17] and [24]. [26]
argues that assumed probability distributions calibrated to data
might be incorrect. Therefore, a deterministic approach that
reoptimizes once more accurate forecasts become available
might avoid this problem [4], [11], [21], [24], [25], [28], [34].
We assume that prices are deterministic.
We consider a discrete time mathematical model. We as-
sume a storage unit is characterized by its energy capacity E
and power rate constraint P . The crucial assumption, which
makes the problem interesting, is that units are large enough
to have market impact, leading to convex costs. Therefore, we
are facing a nonlinear convex dynamic programming problem,
for which we take a Lagrangian approach.
Our model is technology agnostic, and therefore can account
for any storage technology, or, more broadly, flexibility ser-
vices, including demand-side response. At present, pumped-
hydro is essentially the only grid-scale storage technology
that has market impact. However, the fast decreasing prices
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of many storage technologies [16] might mean that they will
start having market impact in the near future.
This problem could be seen as an instance of the warehouse
or wheat trading problem, introduced in [8], which reads
Given a warehouse with fixed capacity and an initial stock
of a certain product, which is subject to known seasonal price
and cost variations, what is the optimal pattern of purchasing
(or production), storage and sales?
The two key differences between our problem and the
literature on the classical warehouse problem [6], [10], [15]
are the power rate constraints and the convexity introduced
by the market impact assumption. In the classical case, costs
are linear as a function of the amount bought, or concave to
account for economics of scale. Furthermore, there is relevant
literature in scheduling hydroelectric generation [2], [22], [32],
which resembles the discharging process of energy storage.
A novel feature of the results presented in [11] for the single
storage unit problem is the identification of forecast horizons,
a time beyond which it is not necessary to look to determine
the present optimal action. They appear as a consequence of
the capacity constraints. Our numerical experiments in Section
V suggest that they also exist for our problem and coincide
with those of the storage unit with largest E/P ratio.
The difference between our approach and a standard rolling
horizon approach [27] is that horizons are not specified in
advance, but identified in the process of finding a solution.
This means that, once horizons are found, we are certain that
no more future price information is needed to determine the
present action. See [9] for more on horizons.
This work is divided in five sections. In Section II, we
introduce the mathematical model, and in Section III we
present Lagrangian sufficient conditions for a solution to be
optimal. Based on them, in Section IV, we introduce a new
algorithm to find an optimal solution. We do not give a
mathematical proof that it provides an optimal solution, but
our numerical experiments in Section V suggest it.
II. THE MODEL
An energy storage unit or unit (E,P ) is determined by its
energy capacity E and power rate P . The energy capacity
is the maximum amount of energy that can be stored in the
unit, typically in MWh. The power rate is the maximum rate
at which energy can be charged and discharged, typically in
MW. Our modelling assumptions are consistent with [11], [20]
and [31], albeit we do not consider efficiencies nor different
charging and discharging power rates.
Let (E1, P1), (E2, P2) be two units. Consider discrete time
steps 1, 2, . . . , T . We assume electricity prices are determin-
istic. To model them, we introduce cost functions
Ct : [−(P1 + P2), P1 + P2] −→ R (1)
for every time step t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Since we are interested
in the cooperative problem, cost functions are functions of
the total amount of energy charged or discharged in a time
step. For positive x, Ct(x) is the cost of buying an amount x
of electricity at time t, whereas for negative x, Ct(x) is the
negative of the reward of selling an amount x of electricity at
time t.
We assume that Ct is monotonically increasing, strictly
convex and Ct(0) = 0 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T . The motivation
to consider increasing cost functions is clear; the more energy
we buy, the more we have to pay. Convexity accounts for the
market impact assumption. The more energy we buy (resp.
sell), the higher (resp. lower) the demand is, and therefore
the higher (resp. lower) the price per unit of electricity is.
It is possible to relax the strict convexity assumption to just
convexity, with similar ideas to those in [11], but we shall not
treat this case here. The last assumption corresponds to the
fact that doing nothing should not have a cost nor a reward.
A strategy is a pair of vectors S = (S1, S2) ∈ RT+1 ×
RT+1, where Sj,t denotes the level of charge of unit j at time
t for j = 1, 2 and t = 0, 1, . . . , T . We fix the initial and
final levels of charge to be S¯j,0 and S¯j,T for j = 1, 2. This
last fixing is essential, otherwise units would be as empty as
possible at time T .
Given a strategy S, we define the increments
(x1(S), x2(S)) ∈ RT × RT associated to it by
xj,t(S) := Sj,t − Sj,t−1 (2)
for j = 1, 2 and t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Our aim is to maximize
the profit made by the two units subject to capacity and rate
constraints. This leads to the following optimization problem:
P : Minimize
T∑
t=1
Ct(x1,t(S) + x2,t(S)) (3)
amongst S ∈ RT+1 × RT+1 subject to capacity constraints
Sj,0 = S¯j,0
0 ≤ Sj,t ≤ Ej , 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1
Sj,T = S¯j,T
(4)
and rate constraints
− Pj ≤ xj,t(Sj) ≤ Pj , 1 ≤ t ≤ T − 1 (5)
for j = 1, 2.
We have taken this problem from [12], but we recognize
that the modelling is very similar to other previous works, for
instance [20] and [31]. A strategy S satisfying both capacity
(4) and rate (5) constraints is called a feasible strategy.
There are at least two cases where problem P reduces to
single unit problems. First, if the cost functions are linear, the
objective function (3) becomes the sum of a function of S1
and a function of S2, since xj,t(S) is a function of Sj only, see
(2). Therefore, solving P is equivalent to solving two single
unit problems.
Second, if the units satisfy
E1
P1
=
E2
P2
, (6)
then we can consider the single unit problem with (E,P ) =
(E1 + E2, P1 + P2). Define λ ∈ [0, 1] to satisfy
E1 = λE = λ(E1 + E2). (7)
Given any feasible strategy R for the single unit problem,
consider the strategy S = (S1, S2) = (λR, (1 − λ)R), which
is feasible for problem P and has the same cost as R.
III. LAGRANGIAN SUFFICIENCY
We now present the Lagrangian sufficiency theorem for
problem P . It introduces µ∗1, µ∗2 ∈ RT , which are essentially
vectors of cumulative Lagrange multipliers. They play a cru-
cial role in our algorithm. The theorem is strongly based on
Theorem 1 from [11], where the corresponding cumulative
Lagrange multipliers are described in detail.
Theorem 1. Assume there exist pairs (S∗1 , µ∗1), (S∗2 , µ∗2) ∈
RT+1 × RT satisfying the following conditions:
(i) S∗ = (S∗1 , S
∗
2 ) is a feasible strategy for problem P .
(ii) For t = 1, 2, . . . , T , (x1,t(S∗), x2,t(S∗)) minimizes
Ct(x1 + x2)− µ∗1,tx1 − µ∗2,tx2 (8)
amongst (x1, x2) ∈ [−P1, P1]× [−P2, P2].
(iii) (S∗1 , µ
∗
1), (S
∗
2 , µ
∗
2) satisfy the complementary slackness
conditions
µ∗j,t+1 = µ
∗
j,t if 0 < S
∗
j,t < Ej
µ∗j,t+1 ≤ µ∗j,t if S∗j,t = 0
µ∗j,t+1 ≥ µ∗j,t if S∗j,t = Ej
for j = 1, 2 and t = 1, 2, . . . , T − 1.
Then (S∗1 , S
∗
2 ) solves problem P .
Proof. Let (S1, S2) be any feasible strategy for problem P .
From (ii), we get
T∑
t=1
Ct(x1,t(S
∗) + x2,t(S∗))− µ∗1,tx1,t(S∗)− µ∗2,tx2,t(S∗)
≤
T∑
t=1
Ct(x1,t(S) + x2,t(S))− µ∗1,tx1,t(S)− µ∗2,tx2,t(S).
Rearranging and using the capacity constraints Sj,0 =
S¯j,0, Sj,T = S¯j,T for j = 1, 2, we get
T∑
t=1
Ct(x1,t(S
∗) + x2,t(S∗))− Ct(x1,t(S) + x2,t(S))
≤
T∑
t=1
µ∗1,t(x1,t(S
∗)− x1,t(S)) + µ∗2,t(x2,t(S∗)− x2,t(S))
=
T∑
t=1
[
µ∗1,t(S
∗
1,t − S∗1,t−1 − S1,t + S1,t−1)
+ µ∗2,t(S
∗
2,t − S∗2,t−1 − S2,t + S2,t−1)
]
=
T−1∑
t=1
[
(µ∗1,t − µ∗1,t+1)(S∗1,t − S1,t)
+ (µ∗2,t − µ∗2,t+1)(S∗2,t − S2,t)
] ≤ 0
where the last inequality follows from (iii).
IV. ALGORITHM
We now introduce a new algorithm to solve problem P ,
via Theorem 1. It uses the single unit algorithm from [11] in
intermediate steps. The algorithm from [11] performs a search
on the parameter µ ∈ RT . Given strictly convex cost functions
Ct for t = 1, 2, . . . , T , it finds a parameter µ∗ ∈ RT and a
vector x(µ∗) ∈ [−P, P ]T , whose components xt(µ) = xt(µ∗t )
are both the unique minimizer of
Ct(x)− µ∗tx, −P ≤ x ≤ P (9)
and an optimal action at time t. To find them, the functions
xˆt : R −→ [−P, P ]
µ 7−→ xˆt(µ) (10)
need to be monotonically increasing and surjective for t =
1, 2, . . . , T , where xˆt(µ) denotes the unique minimizer of
Ct(x)− µx, −P ≤ x ≤ P. (11)
Coming back to problem P , for any (µ1, µ2) ∈ R2, define
the function Cµ1,µ2t by
Cµ1,µ2t (x1, x2) := Ct(x1 + x2)− µ1x1 − µ2x2, (12)
where xj ∈ [−Pj , Pj ] for j = 1, 2. As in the single unit
problem, we would like to associate a unique minimizer of
Cµ1,µ2t to each parameter (µ1, µ2) in such a way that every
minimizer of Cµ1,µ2t has a parameter associated to it. By
considering only increments obtained this way, condition (ii)
of Theorem 1 will be automatically satisfied.
If µ1 6= µ2, then the cost function Ct being strictly convex
implies that there is a unique minimizer of Cµ1,µ2t . However,
if µ1 = µ2, then C
µ1,µ1
t becomes a function of x1 + x2 and
therefore constant on the segments rΓ defined by
{(x1, x2) ∈ [−P1, P1]× [−P2, P2] | x1 + x2 = Γ} (13)
for all Γ ∈ R. Since Ct is strictly convex, there exists a
unique segment that minimizes Cµ1,µ1t , which we call rµ1 . To
overcome this difficulty, we enlarge the space of parameters
(µ1, µ2) ∈ R2. Let κ2 ∈ [0, 1] and define
ν = (ν1, ν2) := (µ1, (µ2, κ2)) ∈ A, (14)
where A := R × (R × [0, 1]). In what follows, it will be
understood that µ1, µ2 and κ2 are the components of the
enlarged parameter ν, as in (14), unless stated otherwise.
We define an order relation on the second component ν2 of
enlarged parameters by ν2 = (µ2, κ2) < ν′2 = (µ
′
2, κ
′
2) if
µ2 < µ
′
2 or (µ2 = µ
′
2 and κ2 < κ
′
2). (15)
Given ν ∈ A, assign a minimizer (xˆ1,t(ν), xˆ2,t(ν)) of Cµ1,µ2t
to it as follows. If µ1 6= µ2, let it be the unique minimizer
of Cµ1,µ2t , irrespective of the value of κ2. If µ1 = µ2, let
x−j,t(µ1) and x
+
j,t(µ1) be the minimum and maximum values
of the xj-component on the minimizing segment rµ1 . Define
xˆ1,t(ν) := (1− κ2)x+1,t(µ1) + κ2x−1,t(µ1)
xˆ2,t(ν) := (1− κ2)x−2,t(µ1) + κ2x+2,t(µ1)
(16)
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T . In other words, we use the extra parameter
κ2 to parametrize the minimizing line rµ1 . We can now define
the strategy (S1(ν), S2(ν)) associated to ν ∈ A recursively,
by following these increments, i.e.,
Sj,0(ν) := S¯j,0, Sj,t(ν) := Sj,t−1(ν) + xˆj,t(ν) (17)
for j = 1, 2 and t = 1, 2, . . . , T . In other words,
Sj,t(ν) := S¯j,0 +
t∑
s=1
xˆj,s(ν) (18)
for j = 1, 2 and t = 0, 1, . . . , T .
Our aim is now to choose a vector of enlarged parameters
(ν1, . . . , νT ) ∈ AT such that conditions (i) and (iii) of Theo-
rem 1 are also satisfied. The crucial observation is that fixing
µ1 (or, analogously, µ2), brings us to a situation where we can
apply the single unit algorithm [11] to unit 2. Indeed, for fixed
µ1 = µ¯1, for every enlarged parameter ν = (µ¯1, (µ2, κ2)),
there exists a unique minimizer (xˆ1,t(ν), xˆ2,t(ν)) of C
µ¯1,µ2
t
associated to it. Furthermore, the functions
xˆ2,t(µ¯1, ·) : R× [0, 1] −→ [−P2, P2]
(µ2, κ2) 7−→ xˆ2,t(µ¯1, (µ2, κ2)) (19)
are monotonically increasing and surjective for t = 1, 2, . . . T .
Note that to guarantee monotonicity, definition (15) is es-
sential if µ2 = µ¯1. Therefore, we can apply the single
unit algorithm to unit 2 with µ1 = µ¯1 fixed, and obtain
a vector of parameters ν2, which we denote by M2(µ¯1) =
(M2,1(µ¯1), . . . ,M2,T (µ¯1)) ∈ (R × [0, 1])T together with
the associated strategies (S1(µ¯1,M2(µ¯1)), S2(µ¯1,M2(µ¯1))),
whose components are given by
Sj,t(µ¯1,M2(µ¯1)) := S¯j,0 +
t∑
s=1
xˆj,s(µ¯1,M2,s(µ¯1)) (20)
for j = 1, 2 and t = 0, 1, . . . , T . Note the difference between
(18) and (20). In (20), ν2 changes over time, while in (18) it
was fixed. The obtained strategy is feasible for unit 2, since
it is a direct application of the single unit algorithm, whereas
unit 1 might still break its capacity constraints.
By applying the single unit algorithm to unit 2 with µ1 = µ¯1
fixed, we reduce the dimension of the vector of enlarged pa-
rameters needed to obtain strategies associated to a parameter.
This is clear from (20), which depends only on µ¯1. Therefore,
we could continue by applying the single unit algorithm to
unit 1, doing a linear search in µ1. For every µ¯1, apply the
process described above to obtain M2(µ¯1) and the associated
strategy (20). It is difficult to show that the functions
xˆ1,t : R −→ [−P2, P2]
µ1 7−→ xˆ1,t(µ1,M2,t(µ1)) (21)
are monotonically increasing and surjective and therefore there
is no guarantee that we can do this. The main difficulty is that
ν2 = M2,t(µ1) is not fixed, but varies as we change µ1. Our
numerical experiments in Section V suggest that it is possible
to apply the single unit algorithm to unit 1.
In order to satisfy condition (iii) of Theorem 1, we need to
make sure that µj,t changes only when unit j is empty or full.
The proposed algorithm does not change µ1,t unless unit 1 is
empty or full, since µ1 is chosen in the outer application of the
single unit algorithm. Nevertheless, a change in µ1,t, when unit
1 is full (resp. empty), might change M2,t(µ1), which would
make unit 2 not satisfy condition (iii) of Theorem 1, unless
unit 2 is also full (resp. empty). Therefore, can any unit play
the role of unit 1, or we need to make a particular choice?
The answer to this question is that unit 1 needs to satisfy
E1
P1
>
E2
P2
. (22)
The rationale behind this choice is that the larger the E/P ratio
is, the longer it takes a unit to complete a charging/discharging
cycle [11]. Therefore, for unit 2 to be empty (resp. full)
whenever unit 1 is also empty (resp. full), unit 2 needs to have
a shorter cycle. There is no guarantee that this will happen,
but the opposite choice would make it almost impossible. We
explore this numerically in Section V, linking it to decision
and forecast horizons for problem P .
The algorithm may be summarized as follows:
1. Sort the units by E/P -ratios, according to (22).
2. For every µ1 ∈ R, obtain M2(µ1) =
(M2,1(µ1), . . . ,M2,T (µ1)) ∈ (R × [0, 1])T and
associated strategies as defined by (20).
3. Find µ∗1 ∈ R that makes unit 1 follow the single unit
algorithm, and identify the corresponding decision and
forecast horizons τ1 and τ¯1. Define the strategy S∗ =
(S∗1 , S
∗
2 ) until the decision horizon τ1 to be
S∗j,t = Sj,t(µ
∗
1,M2(µ
∗
1)) (23)
for j = 1, 2 and t = 0, 1, . . . , τ1.
4. At this point, from the single unit algorithm [11], we
know that
S∗1,τ1 = 0 or S
∗
1,τ1 = E1. (24)
Check whether unit 2 is in the same state as unit 1, i.e.,
empty (resp. full) if unit 1 is empty (resp. full).
If τ1 = T , stop. Otherwise, go back to 2. with S¯j,0 = S∗j,τ1 .
V. NUMERICAL IMPLEMENTATION AND EXAMPLE
We present a numerical example using UK day-ahead hourly
electricity prices of January 2020 [1]. Price data is given by a
vector p = (p1, . . . , pT ) ∈ RT , where pt is the reference price
at time t. We assume that cost functions are given by
Ct(ξ) = (pt + λptξ)ξ, ξ ∈ [−(P1 + P2), P1 + P2] (25)
for any t = 1, 2, . . . , T . Here ξ represents the combined action
of the units and λ > 0 is the market impact factor. Market
impact is modelled as in [11], which is consistent with existing
energy economics literature [29], [30].
Consider two energy storage units (E1, P1) = (7000, 500)
and (E2, P2) = (9000, 2000), which correspond approxi-
mately to the energy capacities in MWh and power rates
in MW of Cruachan and Dinorwig pumped-storage power
stations, respectively [3]. Since we are considering hourly time
periods, the maximum amount of energy unit j can be charged
Fig. 1. Control of two storage units provided by our algorithm.
or discharged in one time period is Pj for j = 1, 2. Note
that, although Dinorwig has larger energy capacity and power
rate, it plays the role of unit 2 due to its smaller E/P ratio.
We consider a market impact factor λ = 5 × 10−5, which
corresponds to that considered in [11] after rescaling the data.
We present the numerical results in Figure 1. We focus on
the week starting on Monday, January 13, the first time period
displayed being the first hour that day. The algorithm was run
for the whole month of January to have realistic initial levels
of charge and capture weekday-weekend variations.
Figure 1 contains four plots. The x-axis is always time, in
hours. From top to bottom, the first plot contains the prices p
[1]. The second and third plots contain the components of the
strategy S∗ = (S∗1 , S
∗
2 ) obtained by the algorithm. Finally, the
bottom plot contains the forecast horizon, in hours.
The first observation is that the algorithm produces a
feasible strategy. This is strong evidence suggesting that (21) is
indeed monotonically increasing and surjective. Furthermore,
we can also see that whenever unit 1 is full (resp. empty), unit
2 is also full (resp. empty). This is strong evidence suggesting
that the obtained strategy S∗ and µ-values satisfy condition
(iii) of Theorem 1. It also suggests that decision and forecast
horizons for problem P should be those of unit 1. Moreover,
since unit 2 gets empty (resp. full) without unit 1 being empty
(resp. full), as in the period between t = 24 and t = 48, it is
clear that the choice in (22) is essential.
We can check a posteriori if the assumptions of Theorem
1 are satisfied, which is the case for the cost functions
considered, meaning that the obtained strategy is optimal. An
open question is whether the algorithm produces a feasible
strategy for any cost functions satisfying the assumptions in
Section II, and, if so, whether it is optimal.
We also observe that there are periods of cross charg-
ing, where one unit charges while the other discharges, as
it can be seen before the evening peaks, at around t =
14, 39, 62, 84, 109, 134, 159. We expect the frequency of these
periods to be reduced by introducing efficiencies into the
model, but might still be valuable in certain circumstances.
The bottom plot on forecast horizons is interesting. Since
a group of actions are determined simultaneously, namely
those actions to be taken before the next decision horizon, the
forecast horizon at those times stays constant. The forecast
horizon increases rapidly until t = 20, to then stay constant
until t = 118, as unit 1 does not get empty or full between
those times. The difference in length of the periods where the
forecast horizon stays constant highlights that they are not set
in advance, as in a standard rolling horizon approach [27].
Furthermore, the look-ahead time, i.e., the difference between
the forecast horizon at time t and t is of the order of days.
Finally, we observe that for the given prices p, the units
make most of their profit from intraday price variations. This
is clear from the strong daily cycles of both units, which are
consistent with the price cycles. Unit 1 also takes advantage of
cheaper weekend prices, by starting full on Monday morning,
t = 6, and being empty by Friday night, t = 118.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented a model, developed the associated La-
grangian theory, and introduced a new algorithm to solve the
cooperative two storage unit problem with market impact.
We have not given a mathematical proof that the algorithm
provides an optimal solution, but the numerical experiments
give strong evidence in favour of it. They also suggest that
decision and forecast horizons exist for this problem and are
precisely those of the storage unit with largest E/P ratio.
In a real-world application, prices are uncertain and would
need to be forecasted. Furthermore, storge units might need to
commit to their actions some time in advance. The existence of
decision and forecast horizons makes it possible for the storage
units to commit until the next decision horizon and reoptimize
their actions after that time with more accurate price forecasts.
This makes this approach suitable to deal with uncertainty.
Future work will consider the n storage unit problem and
deal with storage efficiencies.
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